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‘IT GIVES ME MY FREEDOM’: TECHNOLOGY 
AND RESPONDING TO BODILY LIMITATIONS 
IN MOTOR NEURON DISEASE 
Amanda Pavey, Narelle Warren and Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson 
People living with Motor Neuron Disease (MND) experience profound and rapidly progressing 
impairment. In order to maintain their physical and social functioning, people so affected employ 
a range of technologies and technological aids (body auxiliaries) to enhance their life and 
maintain wellbeing. Using a phenomenological study design, we explored the experiences of 42 
men and women who had been diagnosed with MND. Although many participants initially 
resisted the adoption of aids (often-electronic devices that enabled continued participation in 
daily life) or tools (the instruments that allowed achievement of specific tasks), such 
technologies offered a way for people with MND to overcome, to some extent, the limitations 
posed by their physical degeneration. Through generating a sense of ‘normality’, these kinds of 
‘enabling’ technologies promoted social engagement and the maintenance of valued relationships 
or activities. Technologies can provide people with MND with some positive experiences within 
a way of being-in-the-world that has become so difficult and challenging. 
Keywords: Motor Neuron disease, body auxiliaries, enabling technologies, phenomenology, 
wellbeing 
Running title: Enabling technologies and Motor Neuron Disease 
Media teaser: In the face of rapidly progressing impairment, how do people live a life of 
quality? What role can technologies play in supporting people with MND to live a good life? 
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Motor Neuron Disease (MND) is a terminal, rapidly progressing neurodegenerative disease that 
destroys the body’s functional capabilities, including coordination, communication and 
respiration (Casey 2011, Eisen and Krieger 1998). Life expectancy from diagnosis is usually 
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estimated at between two to five years (Holmes 2005). No definitive symptom allows for easy 
diagnosis, and no definitive diagnostic test is currently available (Locock, Ziebland, and 
Dumelow 2009). The onset of MND causes life-altering circumstances, including fundamental 
changes to employment, social interaction, independence and mobility (Dawson et al. 2004). 
Much research on MND emphasises reduced mobility and ability to communicate as the most 
debilitating aspects of the disease (Leigh et al. 2003, Brown and Addington Hall 2008, Hughes et 
al. 2005). Constantly changing symptoms impact progressively on both sufferer and caregivers, 
as the individual’s lifestyle becomes increasingly restricted (McCabe, Roberts, and Firth 2008; 
Sakellariou 2015). The lived experience of MND reflects experiences of chronic illness more 
broadly, including generating feelings of isolation, loneliness, and being a burden to others, in 
addition to financial pressures, but it is a unique and particularly debilitating illness (Charmaz 
1993, Jeon et al. 2009, Vassilev et al. 2010, Sakellariou 2015).  
Much has been written about the challenges of living with MND (Robinson and Hunter, 1997), 
but with little attention given to how people obtain a sense of positivity or wellbeing despite 
these restrictions. Employing a phenomenological framework (Allen-Collinson and Hockey 
2011, Pavey, Allen-Collinson and Pavey 2013), in this article we explore how forms of enabling 
technology and technological aids can enhance quality of life for people living with MND, and in 
doing so, highlight the tensions that sometimes emerge in living in and through a ‘blended body’ 
(Pavey 2013). We draw extensively on the idea of 'bodily auxiliaries', a concept that describes 
the relationship between the body and matter that is not organically attached, yet which ceases to 
be an external object (Merleau-Ponty 1962) and rather becomes a bodily extension. This focus 
on embodiment – and the social and cultural ways in which people ‘live’ their bodies in everyday 
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life, including the practical arrangements for everyday living, which Pols (2010) terms ‘know-
now’ – offers important insights for analysing the lived experience of those living in and through 
MND-affected bodies. 
DIFFERENT MODES OF BODILY BEING 
A healthy ‘normal’ body has been conceptualized as one that recedes into the background of 
conscious thought, and comfortably disappears (Leder 1990). This is a body that is to some 
extent un-mediated, hidden, and ‘recessive’ so that a person is not overtly aware of the bodily 
self as the subject of experiences (Legrand 2007). During periods of good health, the body 
constitutes a ‘blind spot’ (Crossley 2012) that is largely invisible or 'absent' (Leder 1990) to our 
conscious awareness. In times of illness, the body is thrust into the foreground. Leder (1990) 
argues that the body expresses itself in three schemes of embodiment. The recessive body refers 
to the hidden, inner body of internal organs and processes of which we are not usually aware, 
such as respiration and digestion. In contrast, the ecstatic body is defined as the ‘out-standing’ 
body that projects outward into its environment and is aware of itself via feedback mechanisms. 
Prior to the onset of MND, the ecstatic body provides the main means of an individual reaching 
out to engage with and experience the world, including via the senses (Allen-Collinson and 
Pavey 2014, Legrand 2007, Leder 1990). When the body begins to ‘dysfunction’, the previously 
‘silent’, recessive body, then appears to consciousness, or ‘dys-appears’ (Leder 1990). The dys-
appearing body is that which is suddenly and often forcibly brought to our conscious attention, 
often in experiences of pain, discomfort, illness, but also in moments of intense pleasure. It is at 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
r J
ac
qu
ely
n A
lle
n-
Co
lli
ns
on
] a
t 1
1:2
1 1
7 J
un
e 2
01
5 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
5 
this point that the individual begins a journey towards a sense of mastery over his or her own 
body (Dubose 1997). 
In considering the changing locus of the body in the context of a rapidly degenerating condition, 
we draw on Manderson's (2011) work in exploring the role of technology and technological aids 
in enhancing social interaction and in re-establishing, however partially, some degree of bodily 
control and mastery.  We should emphasize that here, we focus on the more positive, ‘enabling’ 
forms of technology, although we fully acknowledge that many other technological aids that 
people with MND use on an everyday basis (such as breathing devices and feeding tubes, for 
example), are more usually experienced as highly distressing, painful and unpleasant. 
Not all bodies conform to societal received notions of normality, in that bodies considered 
‘normal’ are usually assumed to be free of illness and absent of physical impairment or disability 
(Manderson 2011; Warren and Manderson, 2013). Technology can provide a means of 
overcoming certain physical disadvantages. At the same time, technology may reduce certain 
social and physical barriers, for example, routine social isolation and mobility difficulties 
(Lupton and Seymour 2000). Williams highlights that “the reality of life for most disabled 
people is not the heroic overcoming of dramatic obstacles, but the daily struggle with mundane 
activities” (1993: 103). The use of technology can ameliorate difficulties with such daily 
activities. These ‘body auxiliaries’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962) are used by the body, but are not 
biologically part of the body (Salamon 2006), such as in the case of osseointegration, commonly 
used in orthopaedic surgery, or interocular lens, as used in cataract surgery (Manderson 2011). 
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A body auxiliary thus creates possibilities by allowing an individual to exceed what might be 
physically possible without that object. In the context of MND, 'technology' refers to objects or 
machines that assist human action in some way, and enable a person to complete a given task 
that would not otherwise be possible (Larubia-Prado 2000). Thus, wheelchairs, modified 
household items, remote-controlled appliances (e.g. curtains and lights), hydraulic lifts (e.g. 
hoists to assist a person to get in and out of bed or bath, up and down stairs, and in and out of the 
home), computers, machines to aid communication, hands-free devices (e.g. phones), and voice-
activated mechanisms, are examples of technologies that can aid function and give some control 
to their users over their everyday life (see Sakellariou 2015). Conversely, without these devices, 
there may be little or no autonomy or control. Technology can also open up social space and 
provide enhanced physical capacity and social agency for people with significant physical 
impairments. 
In some senses, technology offers the individual the possibility of extending the self beyond the 
physical limitations of the ‘flesh and bone’ body. The body can thus incorporate (sometimes 
literally) the technology or device to produce a ‘blended body’ (Pavey, et al. 2013). Analogous to 
Leder’s (1990) ‘absent’ body, where the healthy body becomes taken-for-granted, hidden in the 
background, technology also becomes accepted and normalized as a means to make the body 
work properly once again. These 'techno-bodies' are thus considered to be “healthy, enhanced 
and fully functional” (Balsamo 1995: 216), perhaps in some ways bridging the gap between 
‘impairment’ and ‘normal’ functioning. 
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THE STUDY 
To elucidate the ways in which the embodied changes of MND fundamentally affected and 
disrupted the everyday lives of our participants, we invited men and women aged over 18 years 
living in the UK or Australia who had been diagnosed with MND, to take part in the research. 
Participant recruitment within the UK was greatly assisted by the Dementias and 
Neurodegenerative Diseases Research Network (DeNDRoN), funded by the Department of 
Health as part of the National Institute for Health Research and the UK Clinical Research 
Network. The Motor Neuron Disease Association (MNDA) UK also advertised and promoted 
the study on its website, at Regional MND conferences, and in smaller branch meetings. Within 
Australia, recruitment occurred through the Motor Neuron Disease Association Australia 
(MNDA Australia); subsequent to permission from the executive director, the study was 
advertised in newsletters and on its website of the Victoria branch of the association (MNDA 
Victoria), as well as through local branch meetings. Via these routes, participants were invited to 
contact the lead author and express interest in the study. Following this, all participants were 
provided with an information sheet and given an opportunity to ask any questions. Written 
consent was sought from all participants prior to interviews being arranged. Forty-two (31 UK 
and 11 Australia) participants were recruited to take part in the study, including 11 female and 31 
male participants, aged between 42 and 74 years. The project was granted ethical approval by the 
University ethics committee. 
Data collection occurred in two ways. Face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted by the 
first author with ten participants; these were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
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Interviews occurred at a time and in a place of participants’ choosing, and were structured 
around living with MND and the impact this had on participants’ lives. An additional 32 semi-
structured interviews were conducted via email; this strategy allowed greater involvement from 
participants who might otherwise be unable to take part in the research due to the occurrence of 
dysarthria and dysphonia, which limited dialogue in some respects. To counter any data 
limitations, a greater number of participants was sought and interviewed than was initially 
intended in order to ensure data saturation. Data limitations were not due to participants choosing 
not to divulge rich information, but rather to the effect of MND on their ability to articulate 
verbally, particularly in a sustained way. 
Data were analysed using a phenomenological thematic approach, which included the repeated 
close reading of transcripts, familiarizing the researchers with the data (Allen-Collinson 2011).  
The rich and often highly evocative narrative accounts provided vivid experiential accounts of 
participants’ changing bodies. Salient themes and our interpretations of these were discussed 
with colleagues as ‘critical friends’ in order to challenge some of our taken-for-granted 
presuppositions surrounding MND (commensurate with the phenomenological approach 
adopted) and to aid in the formulation and clarity of shared or more idiographic themes and sub-
themes. Throughout the interview process, many opportunities arose for the interviewer (first 
author) to check with participants their understanding of the key points. She would, for example, 
seek participant confirmation via prompts such as: “so it sounds as if you experienced (a specific 
moment) in this way”(with the researcher briefly recounting an experience as had been 
interpreted), and “have I understood you correctly?” By repeatedly employing this practice, the 
interviewer was able to cross-check her initial interpretations. Furthermore, the outcomes of 
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questions across participants were compared to highlight commonalities (and also divergences) 
of experience. 
This approach to data analysis proved an effective means of identifying the many similarities of 
the illness experience, and therefore acted as an aid to identification of the strongest themes 
arising from participant accounts. Analogous to a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 1993), 
we employed an iterative process during interviewing and data analysis, so that themes emergent 
from earlier interview transcripts could be ‘fed into’ subsequent interviews, thus providing an 
opportunity to explore the salience of any particular theme. All participants are identified here by 
pseudonyms. 
MND AND BODILY DYS-APPEARANCE 
MND fundamentally disrupted the lived bodies and everyday lives of participants. During its 
onset and progression, MND had a profound effect on a person’s capacity to engage with the 
world in the taken-for-granted ways previously enjoyed. As many participants reflected, the body 
began to materialize as something to be reified, to be thought about (Colombetti 2011, Legrand 
2007), becoming the main focus of even the most mundane of activities: 
I was going downstairs, right foot first, when I fell, bumpetty bump, all the way to the bottom on 
my back. I thought, ‘how stupid of me not to concentrate’. When it happened again a few days 
later, I realised I would have to hold on tight to the banister in future, and only use one hand to 
carry things. (Olivia) 
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In highlighting the need to keep a hand free to support herself when climbing down the stairs, 
Olivia demonstrates the constant presence of her body. Here, in contrast to other conditions such 
as Multiple Sclerosis (MS) and diabetes (Koch, Kralik and Taylor 2000, Vickers 2012), the body 
never returns to a ‘recessive’ state for varying periods of time; it is generally not possible for 
people to view the condition as simply part of life. For those with MND, however much the 
person tries, the illness can never hide quietly in the background – it is always consciously 
experienced in everyday life: 
I don’t just suffer from MND and the effects of muscle wastage; I suffer from all the things 
connected to it. Symptoms like deep depression, severe cramp, excess saliva, poor circulation 
and terrible sleeping patterns are now a part of my everyday life (Brian). 
Participants sought to understand and make sense of their physical deterioration in various ways. 
For a number of them, bodily degeneration transpired in gradual increments allowing for some 
plateau phases, before worsening again. Other participants, however, reported the deterioration 
as constant:  “Deterioration is very slow but relentless. This makes it very wearing in the long 
term on carers, who inevitably are some family members as well as outsiders” (James). 
The trajectory of MND differs vastly from one person to another, and the participants involved in 
this study illustrated this in describing their own lived experiences. The uncertainty related to 
this variability emerged saliently, and participants coped with this by taking each day as it came:  
“Every day is a new challenge because the disease is on-going, getting worse, so what you could 
do yesterday, you might not be able to do tomorrow” (Ellie). 
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For many, each day became a time of ‘testing’ what could, and what could not be achieved. The 
impact of this on individuals, and the realization of a (sometimes daily) reduction in the body’s 
abilities evoked sentiments of anger, regret, disappointment and worry. This was often tinged 
with sadness, despair and hopelessness “The big problem with all this is that there is no cure for 
MND, so whatever comfort the hospital staff give me, there is a downward spiral and no one (at 
the moment) can save me” (Bob). Against the unpredictability of MND progression, technology 
offered participants a way of minimizing these disruptions, and supported them to live the best 
life they could achieve. 
EMBRACING TECHNOLOGY 
Our participants adopted and utilized all kinds of ‘tools’ and ‘aids’ to continue and enhance 
forms of their bodily engagement with the world. Here the body is offered an opportunity, 
afforded by technology, to extend outwards again, in a somewhat blended and hybrid fashion, to 
re-join and experience the world in a different but appreciated way. This may constitute some re-
establishment of a secondary relationship with the ecstatic bodily self (Leder 1990, Woodgate 
2001).Central to the inclusion of technology in a participant’s life was the feeling of freedom it 
could engender, leading to changes in attitude to visiting new places when assistive aids were 
introduced. In many cases, participants reported visiting only ‘tried and tested’ venues, for fear 
of meeting an unmanageable obstacle somewhere new. After original reluctance and even 
resistance to embracing various aids, many participants reported that their attitudes towards such 
assistive devices had fundamentally altered, and the aids were subsequently cited as invaluable 
means of regaining a degree of independence: 
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Over the years, my attitude has changed considerably. Originally, I resisted the need to use a 
wheelchair and stuck (stubbornly) to using a stick. This was stupid; I would fall a lot and had to 
park very close to where I was going. I needed to find a route where I would have a wall or fence 
on my left which I would use to lean on (with walking stick in right hand) (Andrew). 
After a chance ‘trial’ period in a wheelchair, Andrew realised that rather than the wheelchair 
making him impaired, it was actually his own self-confessed stubbornness that was keeping him 
impaired. Embracing ‘wheels’ bought independence and ‘enablement’ back into his life: 
Using a lift was a long process, as unless I was right beside the lift door I could never make it in 
time. I would guess which one would come first and then wait at that lift until eventually that one 
arrived. Looking back, using a walking stick [rather than a wheelchair] was a ludicrous situation 
but had anyone talked to me about it, I would have ignored them, or worse still, told them to 
mind their own business. Common sense did not prevail until I was coming back from holiday, at 
the airport I was in a wheelchair to be pushed around but I found I could move around on my 
own with it (Andrew). 
After accepting the help afforded by assistive aids, many acknowledged that they would never 
‘get over’ (Briscoe and Woodgate 2010) their illness, as might have been possible with another 
illness. The use of body auxiliaries made it, at least on some level, possible to ‘get through’ 
(Briscoe and Woodgate 2010) certain barriers generated by the illness, to adapt and move 
beyond the confines of the MND body: “I trialled several models [of rollator, a wheeled walking-
frame] and decided to purchase one with a seat. This meant that I was still able to get around 
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without the risk of falling and when the pain in my legs became too bad I could sit down” 
(Olivia). 
By viewing technology as an extension of themselves, as a body auxiliary, participants were 
unwilling to accept that their body was a less mobile body: they therefore saw the adoption of 
technological advances as offering possibilities to enhance the physical self or delay the impact 
of progressive impairment. Ellie, for example, spoke about the freedom her electric wheelchair 
afforded which contrasted ironically with the sedentary nature of being in the wheelchair: “I stay 
in my wheelchair most of the day because it gives me my freedom to move around.” 
Over a period of time, participants began to acknowledge, recognise and embrace a relationship 
with the variety of adaptive aids that enabled them to maintain some parts of their previous, more 
‘able’ life. Certain technologies seemed to promote a sense of standing still, like a plateau, within 
the illness pathway, arresting feelings of relentless decline. Further, ‘tools’ – objects which 
facilitated the completion of tasks related to daily living, such as a bed tray or shower seat –   
provided a means of successfully and effectively negotiating a sense of bodily normality. For 
example, although Ellie still required the help of her husband or a carer to do certain tasks that 
required movement to and from the chair, she felt grateful that at least she was able to move, or 
‘walk’ as she described it, with people from one room to the next using her electric wheelchair, 
when she wanted. 
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Hybridization: reluctance and realization 
Participants commonly spoke of the advantages that emerged from their adoption of adaptive 
aids, without which they could not subsequently imagine their life.  Despite their expressions of 
positivity over this, no participant reported experiencing a straight forward, linear leap from 
living an ‘able’ to this new ‘hybrid’ body, as evidenced by the period of initial struggle described 
by Andrew (above). Many described a moment of realization that, no matter what actions they 
took to prevent it, physical deterioration would occur regardless, as Fay described:  
There’s a Tesco (supermarket) about a mile… just over a mile and a half down the road. Well I 
thought the more I walk, the more I’ll be able to walk ok on the levels, and now I know I must 
have looked like a drunken old bag walking down the ro d. But to me, you know, I thought the 
more I did the stronger I would become, but it wasn’t to be… 
For a woman who was once a very keen hiker, not even being able to walk ‘on the levels’ down 
to the local shop was a particularly low point. Other participants spoke about ‘learning the hard 
way’ about their new capabilities. In Jacob’s case, despite knowing deep down what he could 
and could not do, it was not until he fell that he  realised and then accepted how life had 
irrevocably changed for him. Summarizing bluntly, he noted the options available to him, unless 
he chose to embrace technology: “[Without a wheelchair] I’ve got three choices now; sit down, 
lie down or fall down”  (Jacob).  
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Information Communication Technology (ICT) 
Empowerment via technology presented in many forms. The use of ‘virtualizing’ technology, a 
highly utilized form of technological hybridity in contemporary British society, emerged within 
this study, particularly in the form of on-line technology and communication. Such technology 
opened avenues for participants, providing them with opportunities to discover fresh modes of 
embodiment – potentially changing the nature of their embodiment itself – and generating new 
ways of engaging with the world. Several participants spoke with great enthusiasm about the 
opportunities the internet afforded them, which occurred in a variety of ways: “My laptop is very 
important to me and brings the outside world in. It is my preferred method of communication as I 
find talking on the telephone challenging for me and the listener. I use e-mail, Yahoo messenger, 
and Skype and regularly stay in contact with friends and family” (Judith). 
With reliance on such technologies by participants, the boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
were dissolving, with the interfaces between humans as biological organisms and machines 
becoming cloudy and blurred. Vicky, for example, was keen to advocate the use of email, which 
she felt permitted her to present herself in a more socially normative way: “I can do my photos, 
my research, planning my trips, dealing with the company in Cape Town, emailing travel 
agents…. I sound more normal on e-mail” (Vicky). 
The value of certain types of technology to those with communication difficulties emerged 
strongly during interviews, and participants also spoke of the merits of internet use for 
communication: 
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I had the good fortune to become ill after the invention of the laptop, which means that I am able 
to access unlimited information from my settee, and contact friends throughout the world. 
(Olivia) 
The internet makes a huge difference; you can do almost anything online. (Judith) 
Similarly, Vicky used text messaging with great frequency throughout her day. A key advantage 
for her was that her phone was easily portable, and could be slipped into a pocket when she 
needed both hands to use her rollator to move around the house: “Oh yeah, texting! It’s my 
lifeline! I’m text incontinent!” (Vicky) 
In face-to-face communication with the ‘public’, participants reported the problematic nature of 
others’ perceptions of the MND sufferer as intellectually impaired: “The main problem I have is 
the general public perception of ‘someone who is a little slow’, both in speech and movement, 
therefore I must also have some sort of intellect problem and [they] treat me as such” (Tanya). In 
contrast, participants felt they had more control of their presentation of self in the virtual world, 
including their email communications: “I come across as ‘me’ in email” (Vicky). The use of 
speech aids was also highlighted. While Andrew, for example, had accepted the fact that he was 
going to lose his voice, he intended to do all he could to ‘retain’ as much of his voice as possible. 
For him, this meant resisting becoming entirely reliant on augmentative aids: 
I have a Palmtop (a portable lightwriter) which I use to help my speech. It is a great boost to my 
confidence that with it, I can always get the message across – some would say that I should use it 
more but I want to retain my voice (poor as it is) for as long as possible (Andrew). 
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In these ways, technology provided a means of re-establishing or recreating a favoured self-
identity, via email or other forms of online communication.  It created the opportunity for control 
over the presentation of a very different self, which contrasted to their lack of control over the 
physical self on many dimensions. The meanings ascribed to these assistive aids by some 
participants were that they had simply become part of them, incorporated, so that such aids were 
a component of the ‘extended self’ (Allen Collinson 2009) where body and aid/technology were 
lived as an integrated whole. 
THE FUTILITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
The positive aspects of such embracing of technology should not be over-stated, particularly 
given the decline of the physical body. Despite methods of enhancing individual independence 
through technology, for some participants, MND had already begun to incapacitate them to an 
all-encompassing extent. At this juncture, their physical capabilities declined to such a point that 
little wilful movement was possible, and total dependence upon others was necessary. At this 
point, participants moved to a sense of resignation:  regardless of technology, and the past 
positive interactions with it, no amount of body-technology hybridity was going to halt corporeal 
decline: “I am trapped in my body. My care has now become 24 hour high need care. I am not 
able to do anything for myself. I am still able to think. I no longer leave the house” (Chris). 
To maintain connection with the ‘outside world’, participants also noted the importance of 
suitable public amenities.  Ellie, for example, observed that, despite having someone to help her 
and having the necessary adaptive aids to get to the bathroom, she was considerably hindered by 
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the lack of appropriately designed public facilities: “When we want to go away, we are limited to 
places that can cope with my disabilities. It’s the same with days out, which we love, there’s 
always the worry of the disabled loos not being good enough, so I have to wear incontinence 
pads in case. Now I know why babies cry so much!” (Ellie).  As this became a more frequent 
occurrence and suitable venues became harder to locate, outings reportedly dwindled as tasks 
became further hindered by the continuous physical decline. At this juncture, the individual often 
appeared to arrive at the realization that they were to become largely housebound. 
DISCUSSION 
Participants found the bodily disruptions engendered by MND difficult to relegate to a 
background presence; their narratives were characterized by vivid descriptions of never being 
able to forget the body. Similar to Sartre’s (1966) discussions of the way pain experiences 
change the mind-body-world relationship, MND caused disruptions to the previous taken-for-
granted being-in-the-world. The accounts related here, we argue, support the notion that MND 
fundamentally and irreversibly disrupts and forever changes the lived experience of the world 
(Colombetti 2011; Sakelleriou 2015), affecting the way reality is experienced, prompting the 
‘unfamiliar’ to emerge (Oyebode 2009). At this juncture, the recessive nature of the body 
becomes irrevocably lost for most; instead the body pushes forward, often vividly, into the 
foreground of the individual’s consciousness, becoming the focus of intentionality. 
At times, participants described their bodies in relation to what was, and what was no longer 
possible. The ‘dys-appearing’ body (Leder 1990) brings itself to the forefront of consciousness, 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
r J
ac
qu
ely
n A
lle
n-
Co
lli
ns
on
] a
t 1
1:2
1 1
7 J
un
e 2
01
5 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
19 
presenting itself as disruptive and threatening. This seems to suggest that the onset of impairment 
strips individuals of the opportunity to continue enjoying the ‘seductively predictable flow’ 
(Hockenberry 1995) of their previously enjoyed life. Our data suggest that a new chapter of 
‘perception and action’ (Zeiler 2010) begins with the onset of decline, where MND necessitates 
the need for the reorganization and re-evaluation of the persons’ mind-body-world relation. Such 
occurrences engendered ‘spatio-temporal constriction’ (Leder 1990): as the person’s attention 
becomes drawn away from wider worldly matters and external social engagement, it becomes 
more focused on the bodily here and now. Moreover, our findings suggest, this is accompanied 
by experiences of a profound loss of freedom, spontaneity, identity, sense of self, and feelings of 
alienation and loneliness. It is thus evident that this changes the perception of self, and also the 
perceived perceptions of others, leading to a profound sense of social displacement (Manderson 
2011). 
Taken together, our research findings highlight the ways in which people with MND embraced, 
often following initial reluctance, the use of technological aids - which they generally considered 
as forms of bodily auxiliaries - in order to counteract in some ways the increasing impairment 
and decline of their physical bodies, at least to a certain point. There is great potential for the 
impaired self when combined or blended with technology. In this, there presents an opportunity 
for a person to undergo a learning process, or adopt ‘a playing self’ (Melucci 1996), which 
makes it possible to renegotiate the boundaries presented by the impaired, restricted body. Here, 
people with MND draw on their ‘know-now’ (Pols, 2010), their applied expertise of using 
technologies to produce desired outcomes or achieve specific goals in which functional 
limitations can be mitigated. In doing so, a multiplicity of a ‘reassembled’ and ‘reconstructed’ 
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self (Haraway 1990) is created, and the normative, socially taken-for-granted body is challenged. 
Such combinations or ‘composites’ of bodies and technology is commensurate with Merleau-
Ponty’s (1962) notion of mind-body-world interconnectedness, which problematizes neat 
distinctions between the internal and the external world, for the body ‘extends’ toward an object 
and beyond its own boundaries.  This, we argue, constitutes a secondary ecstatic body. For 
example, the use of an electric wheelchair or rollator becomes an integrated part of the body, a 
tactile and transformative element, a ‘limb’ so integral to daily life and function that the 
individual may wish never to be separate from it. Although not entirely unconsciously, such aids 
become part of their body, with individuals seeing a given aid as giving them back some 
‘freedom’ and ‘independence’. In this way, these aids essentially differ from the tools (e.g. 
catheters, feeding tubes, etc) which facilitate the achievement of daily activities. 
Advanced industrialized nations are currently at the forefront of technological advancements in 
terms of mobility apparatus, and these extensions of the body have opened up opportunities for 
people with many different types of impairment (Howe 2011). Goodley and Runswick-Cole 
(2011) postulate that the true potential of the cyborg body lies in its uncertainty and multiplicity. 
Translating this to those with MND, such technology changes the certainty of incremental 
physical decline, and disability commensurate with MND, into the uncertainty of various 
possibilities to reinvent and maintain some semblance of the self, to reshape and reconstruct 
identity. ‘Body’ technology has the potential to empower individuals with complex physical 
needs (Howe 2011). 
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In this study, at least, embracing technology appears to have an overwhelmingly positive affect. 
Where there are no answers in terms of cure, and few options for symptom management, 
individuals seemingly turn to technology to seek ways of combating the rapid and uncontrollable 
advancement of their impaired world. Here, there emerges an opening toward optimism, 
excitement, new horizons – and this was evident when it came to ‘tools’ involving the internet. 
For people with disabilities more widely, inclusion of ICT in day to day lives has been shown to 
be closely linked to issues of independence, quality of life, and empowerment (Schoech, 
Cavalier, and Hoover 1993, Vicente and Lopez 2010). For participants, the internet was 
described as an essential coping strategy, providing them with a method of taking some control 
over their illness and independence. More broadly, ICT has the possibility to reduce certain 
disabling barriers that impair and prevent participation in many activities (Ritchie and Blanck 
2003). In these ways, technology can help generate some degree of optimism as the individual 
becomes influenced and awakened to its possibilities. This is especially salient given the 
constructions of future life with MND which characterize the somewhat limited duration left as 
seemingly hopeless, and reduced in opportunity and spontaneity. Such a view coheres with 
studies of disability more generally, where individuals living with impairment have been found 
to indicate the use of ICT as a method of enhancing their decision making capacity through being 
able to access information (Waldron, Lavitt, and Kelley 2000). 
A cautionary note on the positive possibilities of technologically-assisted embodiment is also 
necessary, for whilst it was apparent that technology could ‘enable’ in many ways, there was a 
point at which it was no longer able to overcome or compensate for the extensive decline of the 
physical self.  Thus there appears to be two main points of displacement between the body and 
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the ‘hybrid’ or ‘blended’ body. On the one hand, at the onset of symptoms there is a 
psychologically-inclined barrier toward accepting a union between self, body and technology. 
Here, identity, the loss and relinquishment of a ‘normal’ way of functioning, and the concern of 
being seen by others using and adopting adaptive aids appears to be a key factor in not 
embracing a hybrid, technologically facilitated body; this was further forestalled by earlier, 
negative experiences of MND-related technologies, such as feeding tubes. At the other end of the 
illness cycle, as death draws nearer, the body itself rejects, prevents and resists such blending. 
The physical decline incapacitates the ability of the person to interact with objects and tools that 
exist around her or him, thus this lack of ability ultimately prohibits any desired engagement.  
However keenly individuals advocated the positive aspects of technology, at no point did any 
participant appear to display total integration or ‘corporeal absorption’ of the aids or tools they 
utilized. Rather, they appeared to be comfortable (at least to some extent) with them, utilizing 
them as a means to keep going out and doing what they wanted to do, to enjoy life as far as they 
could, where they could, and continue some semblance of a ‘normal’ life as far as possible. 
Practitioners have an essential role in supporting individuals autonomously to negotiate the 
possibilities offered by technology in managing the inevitable physical declines of MND. 
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